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BOOK REVIEWS
Yankee Lawyer: The Autobiography of Ephriam Tutt. New York:
Charles Scribner's Son. 1943. Pp. xiii, 464. $3.50.
Is Ephriam Tutt a living person? Does he actually practice in
New York City, stalking the courtrooms, confounding learned judges
with his wisdom, and moulding juries through his wit and eloquence?
Many persons believe so strongly that Tutt is living, still practicing law
(and administering the "Pidgeon Fund") and assuaging the struggles
of the little people, that they have refused to be convinced that Yankee
Lawyer is a fictitious biography.
That distorted notion has its basis, to some degree, in the authentic
appearance which author Train has purposely given his book. The
title page, the apparently genuine photographs, the citing of individual
cases, and the mention of actual people and places with which most
readers are familiar not only is not conducive to having Tutt accepted
as a mere literary character; but they fan into reality the already existing notion that he is a famous person. However, more than these
technical reasons is responsible for the belief in Ephriam Tutt's actual
existence. The skill of the author as a writer and as a student of the
habits of the minds of the human race, his acute sense of humor and his
extremely human outlook, plus his own wealth of experience as a lawyer, are what really created the illusion. It did not grow because of
the gullibility of the reading public; rather it was the discerning mind
of Arthur Train which proffered the legend. By presenting Tutt as a
man with an humble beginning, who rose to the heights through bis
own initiative to live the useful life, and as an ideal lawyer, willing to
give his talents in assisting the desperate, not for money but from an
innate faith in the human race-by these devices he insured his acceptance by a mass of readers. Certainly he captured the attention of the
American public by retelling its favorite folktale.
Yankee Lawyer is a mythical autobiography. Beginning with his
birth and childhood, Tutt tells of his early years, his education at Harvard, his first practice in a rural community, his initial and subsequent
romantic ventures, his struggles for success, and his crowning achievements. In the interim, Train's views are expounded by Tutt, both by
his direct statements and, more subtly, in situations. The distinction
between law and justice is well-drawn, and also aptly presented is his
idea of the jury's rendering justice by serving as a bulwark between
the accused and the frequent strictness of the letter of the law.
Tutt's career can be divided into four phases. As a country lawyer
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he learned that an attorney does not practice merely to make money.
ie realized that one practices law to know the law, and that the only
way to know it is to practice it. "There is no better training for the
law than general practice in a country town." A city lawyer might
spend a decade representing a large corporation, or running titles to real
estate, and at the end of that time he would have represented no client
of flesh and blood; his legal knowledge would be limited to those subjects alone. A country lawyer seldom represents soulless clients; he
has human beings whose lives and liberties depend upon his sense of
responsibility and his- knowledge of every subject. Thus he is familiar
with "fence-line" law, domestic relations and indiscretions, wills, torts,
criminal law, and-most important-"he must personally draft every
paper from the original summons to the final judgment." A country
lawyer has a full life; the loves, passions, hatreds, and longings of
generations disclose themselves in his unpretentious office. "He becomes the father confessor to the inhabitants of his town; and, though
his income in cash is negligible, what he learns is beyond price."
Tutt's career as a prosecuting attorney in New York began by
sheer luck. The position was a reward to him from "Boss" Croker,
the "Master of Manhattan" and "Uncrowned King of New York
City," for aid given to him by Tutt when the former was injured in an
accident. "As a prosecuting attorney Tutt saw the criminal bar unfold
itself-a collection of 'down-at-the-heel' lawyers, drunkards, ex-police
magistrates, unfrocked priests, and political riff-raff." Here Tutt
learned the "ins-and-outs" of criminal procedure in the metropolis, its
connection with politics, and the fact that law and justice do not coincide because justice is too often a "luxury that the poor cannot afford."
He also found that the constitutional guarantees of right to a jury trial,
right to representation by counsel, and the protection of due process of
law are phrases of no meaning to the ignorant person accused of crime.
He discovered that one of the foremost duties of a lawyer is to see
that the provisions of the Bill of Rights are applied to all people, regardless of creed, class, or race. It would have been easy for Tutt to
have become so entangled in the political web of his job that he would
have devoted a lifetime to it; but he learned his second lesson: that
the "law is a jealous mistress and brooks no rival"-not excepting
politics.
When the inevitable reform movement overthrew "Boss" Croker's
rule, Tut joined a "Wall Street Legal Factory," the well-publicized
firm of Hotchkiss, Levy and Hogan. This writ mill did not practice
law; it conducted a business. One member was a "joiner" to get the
business, another was the "brains" who planned the court campaigns,
while another was the "court lawyer" who represented the firm and
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clients in court. "Here Tutt's clients were bankers, industrialists, and
Here he did not fight for
railroad presidents; not humble folk ....
civil liberties; he merely quarreled over a wad of money." He resigned
from the firm in which he had become one of the "brains" when it
attempted to break a will on the ground of insanity, a wholly unwarranted claim. It was then that he learned that, above all else, a lawyer
must be honest.
After resigning from the "Wall Street Factory," Tutt entered into
private practice in New York City. He had a sound background: the
legal knowledge and sympathy for human suffering of a country lawyer,
the acumen and acquaintances of a prosecuting attorney, and the business contacts of a writ mill. He then reached the pinnacle of his success and the enviable financial position which carried the luxury of
being able to select his cases. Case after case came to him-ordinary
cases, and some extraordinary, one taking him to England; but all of
them involved the struggles of people. Between cases Tutt spent most
of his time fishing, and reading Shakespeare and the Bible. He had
learned his final lesson: that the highest reward that the law offers
is not a judgeship or a political job, but the fact that a lawyer is his
own boss, and that his time, his mind, and his life belong to himselfnot to a labor union, a university, or an employer-but to himself alone.
Yankee Lawyer could have been Written only by a lawyer with a
varied background. It, furthermore, could not have been written by
any man, though he be a lawyer and an author, who did not possess a
love for humanity, a marked sense of humor, and a belief in the dignity
of the individual.
ENSIGN BARNAXm

T. WELShI, U.S.N.R.

Member of the Maryland Bar.
U. S. Naval Pre-Flight School,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
Governmental Adjustment of Labor Disputes. By Howard S. Kaltenborn. Chicago: The Foundation Press, Inc. 1943. Pp. xi, 327.

$3.50.
The reader who would come for knowledge and understanding of
methods of adjustment of labor disputes will find the book a barmicidal
feast. Presumably the book deals with the systems established by the
states and municipalities as well as by the Federal Government, but the
treatment afforded by the author is elementary, uncritical, and incomplete in scope at that. Thus, the Wisconsin experience, which is probably the richest among the states, is passed over altogether.
Professor Edwin E. Witte, who wrote the Foreword, may be pardoned for his pride in his former student. It is evident that the author
is faithful to his tradition, but it is unlikely that the discerning reader
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will agree with Professor Witte that the book "is such a contribution
to the literature of labor relations that any one working in this field
would gain credit as its author." The reviewer has not had the opportunity to check dates and figures but he believes that the volume will
prove very useful as a compendium of vital statistics on the subjects
of conciliation, mediation, arbitration and compulsory investigation.
The reader will find out when, how, and by whom certain agencies were
organized; what the provisions of certain statutes are; but no critical
examination of the issues and problems involved. The author is chief
wage analyst of the Detroit Region of the National War Labor Board
and has undoubtedly had opportunity for first-hand knowledge of such
crucial problems of labor relations as union security and wage stabilization, but their treatment in the book is on a perfunctory level. Not
only is the forest invisible, but even the trees are missing.
In only one respect is the fossorial evident in the author: his first
and only love-mediation. On the very threshold of the study the
reader is informed that "After careful study, the author has reached the
conclusion that mediation is by far the best and most successful method
of governmental intervention in the adjustment of labor disputes."'
From then on no opportunity is lost to drum this into the consciousness
of the reader. At least this reader was not persuaded, though frequently annoyed by the unnecessary reiteration. The figures marshalled
by the various mediation agencies to indicate the effectiveness of the
mediation technique are not very reliable because it is possible to
approximate one hundred percent success by the simple device of keeping a case open until the labor dispute is over.
More important, mediation is a complex itself undergoing transmutation with the variation in the nature of its components. Thus
what is referred to as mediation now is quite different from what it
was a decade ago and what it will be in the future. The author dedares that "Mediation involves the intervention of a third party who
has no compulsory powers but who merely attempts to persuade the
parties to reach a settlement. The mediator may merely act as a 'gobetween' in the negotiations between the parties, or he may make definite suggestions as to the terms of settlement."12 Before the enactment
of the National Labor Relations Act the primary and most difficult
function of the mediator was to persuade the employer to meet with the
union. Now that is established as a legal duty. As to the union, save
in the case of unauthorized "quickies," it is doubtful whether there is
any great inclination to empty the chairs around the conference table
to fill the picket line. Where an impasse develops between great industrial units and great labor organizations it is unlikely that the charm
and tricks of the trade of the mediator will dissolve it. The resolution
IP. 2.

2

P. 2, n. 2.
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of the conflict in such cases is more likely to result from the totality
of pressures, obvious or hidden, both political and economic, that may
be present. The mediator about the premises may at best help to save
face by suggesting terms of settlement but a closer examination would
reveal the workings of compulsive imperatives.
The National Mediation Board is pointed to as proof of the success
of mediation. But important factors are ignored: existence for a long
time of strong labor organizations and the duty to bargain collectively,
and the fact that a railroad strike on a national scale, even in time of
peace, would be intolerable. Hence the tendency in recent years in
peace as well as in war, for outstanding railroad disputes to be settled
through recommendations of emergency boards appointed by the President rather than by the National Mediation Board. At any stage of
adjustment of a railroad labor dispute, the element of compulsion is
present though not visible to the uncritical eye.
Compulsion with very definite sanctions is of course the foundation
of the National War Labor Board. No pretense of voluntary mediation
can be made in behalf of that body.
As to the post-war period voluntary mediation will undoubtedly
play an increasingly important role, but in the peripheral areas of
industry. With the spread of collective bargaining and strong labor
organization government intervention to decide the crucial provisions
of the trade agreement will become inevitable. There will also prevail the significant practice of impartial arbitration to administer the
terms of a trade agreement. Of course, both labor and industry appear
to be anxious for a relaxation of wartime restrictions, and they may
succeed but only temporarily. From a long range point of viewwithin a generation let us say-the trend is definitely in the direction
of compulsives. The reviewer does not believe that strikes can be
eliminated by compulsion, but for better or worse more and more of
the employment relationship will be regulated and controlled by the
government. Both industry and labor will have to function on the
administrative level, not autonomously. This is implicit in our technological civilization and the large scale organization of both industry
and labor.
The author relies as authority for his thesis about voluntary mediation on the Webbs' IndustrialDemocracy and on a 1916 work by other
authors.3 The reviewer suspects, however, that something has been
happening in the world since then.
JOSEPH RosrN'iu .
Labor Relations Editor,
The Research Institute of America,
New York City.
P. 218.
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Radio Networks and the Federal Government. By Thomas Porter
Robinson. New York: Columbia University Press. 1943. Pp.
278. $3.50.
One enters upon the review of this volume with an interest stimulated by the newness of the subject matter and by its fundamental
importance in the political and economic life of present-day America.
The radio rivals the press if it has not surpassed it as a means of carrying vital communications to the whole people. Its proper regulation
and control is therefore a matter of supreme importance.
The work is centered around the growth and operation of the great
nationwide broadcasting networks and the Federal Communications
Commission as the established agency for their regulation. The author
does not state his purpose in writing the book. This, however, becomes
apparent as one proceeds through it. The publisher states that it "is
the first comprehensive history of network broadcasting and its relation
to the Federal Government."
We are all, perhaps, too well aware of the fact that in this country
broadcasting is supported financially by advertising. The three networks, N.B.C., C.B.S., and Mutual, produce programs in their studios
which are sponsored and paid for by advertisers. These programs are
carried by wire to affiliated broadcasting stations, where they are put
on the air. By extending coverage to all the more important cities in
the country, these programs can be heard throughout the nation. Because of the great multitude of listeners such sponsored programs
become very effective as a means of advertising. The financial returns
from this business are becoming very large.
The great majority of broadcasting stations are independently owned.
All must be licensed by the Federal Government. These independent
stations become affiliated with the networks by contracts. By agreement the networks engage what is called "option time" from the stations. That is, the right to broadcast through the individual station
programs at certain selected hours. For this right the network pays
at stipulated rates. The local station is at liberty to broadcast its own
programs or features uring the time not sold. Each of the networks
has its own affiliated stations and by exclusive dealer contracts agrees
mot to broadcast through other stations in the local area. These agreements are the heart of network broadcasting. By them the network
secures dependable outlets for its commercial programs to a nationwide
audience and by them the local station secures desirable programs and
financial returns. A very peculiar thing about these contracts is that
the local station can reject the network programs at will, provided the
local station deems them not in the public interest. The author points
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out that such rights of rejection are "perhaps the most illogical aspect
of the situation." This peculiar power in the local station is fostered
and sustained by the Communications Commission.
The work is obviously not intended for the legal profession. Regarding the question of appeals from the Commission, the author says,
"This is a highly legalistic matter and need not concern us." The
author is, however, dealing with materials that the law deals with, and
one could wish that for the sake of clarity, he had employed more of
the legal approach. The basis of Federal regulation is statutory. If
the Radio Acts of 1927 and 1934 are too long to be given in full, a
summary would aid the reader. The Communications Commission
made an extensive investigation into network broadcasting, out of which
came certain rules laid down by the Commission which vitally affect
"chain broadcasting." The author spends much time criticising these
rules, yet he does not give us the complete set of rules adopted. A
reader seems justified in wanting to know what rules were adopted
under the Commission's rule-making powers. A summary of the report of the Commission's long investigation would also seem justified.
In addition to his comprehensive evaluation of Commission regulation of this growing business, the author develops some interesting technical phases of the subject. Thus an explanation of the fact that there
are not more networks in competition with each other is said to be the
limited range of radio wave frequencies available for use. This natural
barrier, the author thinks, will be overcome by further scientific development in the future in the realm of short wave broadcasting.
While the radio has come to be a necessary means of supplying
essential information as well as programs of cultural and recreational
benefit, neither the network nor the broadcasting station has been
legally classified as a public utility. The U. S. Supreme Court has
held in the Sanders Brother's Case, 309 U. S. 470, 60 Sup. Ct. 693
(1940) that the radio field is open to free competition. This ruling
places the industry in the category of "a business affected with a public
interest," being subject to governmental regulation. The opening of
the field to private enterprise amounts to little, however, because the
spectrum of radio wave frequencies does not provide room for many
newcomers.
As has been the case with many other large business enterprises,
the broadcasting networks have run afoul of the Antitrust Laws. A
suit under these laws is now pending having been instituted by the
government in 1941, charging unlawful combination and conspiracy in
restraint of inter-state commerce. This was followed in 1942 by a suit
for $10,275,000 for damages by the Mutual Broadcasting System vs.
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the Radio Corporation of America and N.B.C. These cases have not
been decided.
In chapter fifteen the author gives his estimate of the Communications Commission as a regulative body.
1. He says that the "Commission can fairly be charged with
political bias and favoritism in the past."
2. The regulations passed by the Commission were conceived
"in an atmosphere of acrimony and intense partisanship"-"an
atmosphere alien to an intelligent and calmly deliberated plan."
3. The regulations "were adopted in haste, without adequate
consideration and in the absence of full understanding, of their
import."
To the author, Chairman James L. Fly's contention that under the
adopted rules "the network is free" and "the station is free" is utterly
fantastic. He says, "If chain broadcasting is to be preserved on any
kind of stable and efficient basis it is a sheer impossibility to have the
network entirely independent and the stations entirely independent."
Finally, the author definitely favors the American system of broadcasting in preference to government-owned and operated broadcasting
in use in all other large countries. He thinks "advertising should continue to be the major means of financing broadcasting" and that it is
"to the public interest to have both individual stations and networks."
In the appendix the N.B.C. and C.B.S. forms of contract for use
with individual stations are given. In the Bibliography the absence
of reference to Cushman's valuable work on The Independent Regulatory Commissions is noted. Neither is reference made to a fortypage chapter on "Communications" in Government and the American
Economy by Fainsod and Gordon. The author lists five decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States as source materials. For
effective use these decisions should have volume and page numbers
given. Some statutes affecting radio in the years 1928, 1929 and 1930
are not mentioned. A ten-page index adds to the value of the work as a
reference book.
The work is free from bias and is unflinching in emphasizing shortcomings of the Commission and network officials alike. It is a valuable
appraisal of Federal regulation in this field.
R.

Professor of Business Law,
University of North Carolina.

J. M. HoBBs.
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New York: Alfred A.

This is a fascinating little book and its perusal will delight all who
feel an interest in the application of legal principles and processes to
the problem of the punishment of the Hitler gangsters after the coming
of peace. Instead of a philosophical treatise on the issues which their
trial will raise, Dr. Radin uses the method of a dramatic description
of a supposititious trial held in Luxembourg in 1945. This distinguished scholar, German born but American bred, author of a wide
range of volumes on Comparative Law, lecturer in several of our best
law schools, is well equipped to explore the juridical suppositions upon
which such an actual trial may some day rest.
By 1945, the resistance of the Third Reich is assumed to have
collapsed and the United Nations are in military occupation of Germany and her associated and satellite countries. A High Commission
has been constituted, consisting of five members. The President, representing Great Britain, is from Belfast. The others are a former
Chinese Ambassador to France, a Russian Professor of Law, a former
Solicitor General of Australia, and a retired Circuit Judge of the
United States. The defendants are Hitler, Goebbels, Himmler, Funk,
Gastein, Milch, and Ribbentrop. Goering had been killed in an air
raid during hostilities. The Prosecutor is a Dutch lawyer, the leading
counsel for the defense a German lawyer never associated with the
Nazis and enjoying a high international reputation.
At the outset, an issue arises as to the language in which the proceedings are to be conducted. French had been intended as the traditional language of international diplomacy, but the point is made that
French is not understood by one or more of the defendants and, with
a scrupulous fairness, the Commission announces, with understandable
dissatisfaction of the audience, that the proceedings will be in German.
The composition of the audience, limited rigidly to the available seats,
and the measures taken to avoid disorder, attempts at rescue of, or violence to, the defendants, reflect the care with which the arrangements
have been planned.
The precise charges against the culprits are illuminating reflections of the historical development of Criminal Law. Hitler et al. are
not accused of bringing on war. War is a traditional and recognized
instrument of national policy which no race of people has ever succeeded in outlawing. They are not brought before the bar of world
opinion for the incalculable misery they have inflicted on mankind and
the millions of deaths they have caused. The charge is simply "murder," not murder of a generation, of a race, of a nation, of a city.
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Nothing so grandiose! Hitler is not to be played up as was Napoleon.
"Did not Bonaparte produce his Napoleon Opera with all too stupendous stage setting? With music of cannon volleys and the murder
shrieks of a world, his stage-lights were the fires of conflagration, his
rhyme and recitative the march of embattled hosts and the crash of
falling cities." Hitler et al. are charged with the simple murder of
three obscure individuals: one a Frenchman shot as a hostage, one a
Czech hung because on his apartment house scurrilous epithets were
scrawled in association with the Fiihrer's name, one a Russian Jew
bayoneted when too weak to continue the forced labor to which he had
been assigned.
And so the trial opens. The arguments on the jurisdiction of the
Court and the basis upon which it is sustained are perhaps the most
interesting part of the play of intellect between Court anq counsel.
The deaths are proven by actual eyewitnesses, in some cases by Gestapo
agents promised immunity. Then comes a gap, not satisfactorily
bridged for one with the traditions of English common law. The personal responsibility of the defendants, members of the German Inner
Council of Defense, is established only by statements of the President
that members of the Commission had in advance of trial examined the
records of the Council of Defense and become satisfied that each of
the defendants had personally participated in the formulation of the instructions under which death had been visited on the victims in question.
But enough of this description of the trial. Read it and feel the
nervous tension of the audience when the defendants repudiate their
counsel and decline to enter the court room except by force. Thrill at
the dramatic power with which this temperate German, who hates the
Nazi concept of superior-inferior races, nevertheless describes the
power of such an ideology to destroy the inhibitions which civilized
people otherwise feel. Share, the final verdict of the newspaper men
that Hitler is merely a common ruffian heading a gang of rats' and that
the lawyers are, after all, a little bit of all right.
KEMP D. BATTLE.
Member North Carolina Bar,
Rocky Mount, North Carolina.
I Can Go Home Again. By Arthur G. Powell. Chapel, Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press. 1943. Pp. 301. $3.00.
A North Carolina lawyer, appearing by comity in a Texas court,
asked the jurors on voir dire only one question: "Is there any gentleman on this jury who is under the impression that a man from North
Carolina is a damn Yankee?"' 1
' Hon. Walter D. Siler of Suler City, N. C., at Conroe, Texas, in the case of
Heirs at Law of Wilson Strickland v. Humble Oil Co. et al.
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No Tat Heel lawyer after reading this book by a Georgia judge
will fear being misunderstood in Georgia, for he finds that down there
also, folks who don't have to buy them call gardenias cape jessanines
and the "Big Road" means just what it does here. Nice children say
"bad man" and "bad place" instead of using the proper names permitted their elders; and intelligent people-although they do not believe in it, of course-turn their hats out of an abundance of precaution when a rabbit crosses their paths. The Hardshell Baptists of
Georgia think good liquor never hurt any man; the Methodists preach
the doctrine of "falling from grace" and practice what they preach;
the Baptists preach against the 'doctrine but they also practice what the
Methodists preach-at least, so says judge Powell.
Likewise in Georgia "Big Court" is held at the county seat and
Judge Guerry who presided there in 1891 would find that few North
Carolina "Big Courts" today dissent from his ruling then "that in this
state a judge of the Superior Court has but damned few privileges,
but one of them is to do just as he damned pleases." It was not Judge
Guerry but another Georgia jurist, Judge Powell reports, who frequently said to counsel: "Oh, I know you can take me to the Supreme Court and reverse me, but this plaintiff is not entitled to
recover and I am not going to allow it if I can help it." Judges, it
seems, are very much like judges.
This book, however, is the story of the first thirty-three years of
the author's life in Blakely, the county seat of Early County, in the
southwest part of Georgia "where the states Georgia, Florida, and
Alabama corner." Here Arthur G. Powell was born in the tallowcandle days of 1873 and here he lived until January 1, 1907, when he
went to Atlanta as a judge of the Court of Appeals. The story in
between is told in terms of his "piney-woods" environment. Environment, as used by Judge Powell, includes his ancestors as well as all
the people who made an impression on his youthful mind or adult life.
Their vignettes are as delightful as a box of old pictures.
Arthur Powell's paternal grandfather, a Baptist preacher who sired
twenty-four children, told his son, Richard Powell, the author's father,
that unless he would forego his ambition to be a lawyer he would not
send him to school "as all lawyers were liars." Came the War Between
the States and nineteen-year-old Richard volunteered. In the last year
of the war he lost his right leg and returned home to find his father
dead. He passed the bar examination on his record as a Confederate
soldier and, for his time and day, became a successful lawyer. It was
inevitable that his son should follow in his footsteps. Before he was
six years old the author was accompanying his father to the justice
courts in various parts of the county. By the time he was ten he was
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copying legal documents and attending to the practice in the justice
courts when the defendant made no appearance. At fifteen he was a
Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court. At eighteen he secured his law
license, thus acquiring the title of "Colonel" and then began to ride
the backwoods circuits with his father. At twenty-one he was a judge
of the County Court and at thirty-three he was on the Court of
Appeals.
The anecdotes and legal lore acquired during this remarkable career
are all in the book. It offers no profound philosophy of the law nor
attempts any searching analysis of social problems although the author
gives his views on the Negro problem, expresses his fears of "New
Deals," and affirms the belief in government under laws developed "out
of the time-tried experience of mankind under evolutionary processes."
The real purpose of this book is to charm and entertain. It does both
and more. It is a documentary film of an era-an era in which a postwar generation grew away from the bitterness and hatred of sectional
ways; an era when the best citizens sold liquor without criticism, and
when four dollars was a good fee for taking depositions. It was the
day when church members were expelled for dancing (the author was
himself), and when schools lasted only thirty weeks a year. Hangings
were public; verdicts always went against the railroad, and no judge
would endanger his popularity by forbidding jurors and spectators to
chew tobacco in the courtroom and spit on the floor!
Although his formal education was scanty, Judge Powell aptly
demonstrates that "education is not to be found in the schools alone"
and that while "law is a science, the practice of law is an art." He
pokes a little fun at the Yale law professor with whom he associated
in the trial of a case when he says that the professor's brief came down
to this: "The courts of the country are badly divided on the question,
but the majority of the courts and the greater weight of the authorities'
are with us. Yet the question is a doubtful one." The professor will
not, but most lawyers will pardon the author's pride in the story of
how he moved the teacher's dead horse to a street the name of which
he could spell. Judge Powell, however, would not go so far as the old
lawyer who advised him that "a knowledge of the law is a bad thing
for a lawyer, for it may be against him and give him less confidence
in his case."
Judge Powell's keen sense of humor keeps in check the egotism
which, he says, his father developed in him. His closest call occurs in
the last chapter when he includes the superlative praise of a campaign
endorsement written for him by Chief Justice Bleckley "not for what
it says of me but because it is so characteristic of Judge Bleckley's
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style." Every lawyer knows, of course, that any evidence admitted,
however restricted, is in the jury box for all purposes.
In a closing chapter the author discusses the celebrated case of
Leo Frank who was convicted of the murder of Mary Feagan and
lynched when Governor Jack Slayton heroically forfeited all his political ambitions to commute the death sentence. It is a matter of real
regret that Judge Powell made any reference to his own contact with
the case, particularly since he had no official connection with it. He
says he knew Leo Frank to be innocent and that he also knew who did
kill Mary Feagan. This boast, coupled with the statement that he got
his information in such a way that he. could not honorably make it
public and that he did not reveal it to his close friend the governor
him
when he was considering Frank's application for clemency, lays
2
quarters.
many
from
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has
he
which
criticism
the
to
open
Indeed, so great was the criticism that Judge Powell rewrote this
section of the book for its second edition. Nevertheless, most readers
will conclude that he greatly weakened his position by so doing. In
the first edition, with reference to his knowledge, he says: "Intimate
as I am with Jack Slaton I have never discussed this fact with him,
but I am quite sure that I know how he knew that Frank did not kill
Mary Feagan." From this one might easily conclude that since the
responsible official already knew that Frank was innocent there was no
duty on Judge Powell to speak.
In the second edition, however, after explaining that he learned
who killed Mary Feagan subsequent to Frank's trial, he says: "Without ever having discussed with Governor Slaton the facts which were
revealed to me, I have reason to believe, from a thing contained in the
statement he made in connection with the grant of the commutation,
that, in some way, these facts came to him and influenced his action."
Thus it appears that it was not until Frank's fate had been determined
and announced that Judge Powell learned the governor knew the man
was innocent! The governor had struggled with the problem, so far as
he knew, unaided by the truth. While he does not say outright that
he acquired his information from the attorney-client relationship he
obviously intended to leave that impression by remarking that lawyers,
when admitted to the bar, take an oath never to reveal a communication
made by clients, or by prospective clients attempting to employ a lawyer,
and that such communications would not be received in evidence if a
lawyer attempted to reveal them.
A North Carolina lawyer takes no such oath as Judge Powell says
"To list a few: Tampa (Fla.) Sunday Tribune, Dec. 12, 1943; The Daily

Hebrew Journal, Jan. 10, 1944; Burlington Times News (N. Car.), Nov. 23,
1943; Greensboro Daily News (N. Car.), Dec. 5, 1943, and Dec. 10, 1943.
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lawyers take. It is true that rules of evidence do not ordinarily permit a lawyer to testify in court as to a confidential communication
made to him by a client on the faith of their relationship, but if the
client sought advice to aid him in some act criminal per se such communications are not privileged. However, since the executive applies
no rules of evidence at a clemency hearing, this law did not apply to
Judge Powell's situation. Even if Georgia required such an oath from
its attorneys as the author indicates, few right-thinking people would
regard it as binding when silence would cost the life of an innocent man.
Such a communication as the one Judge Powell regarded as so highly
privileged is also so highly criminal that whoever received it, "attorney
or not attorney, lies under an obligation to society in general, prior and
superior to any obligation he can lie under to a particular individual,
to make it known." 4
Such a question of morals and legal ethics should not have been
introduced into this pleasant book. The author himself, however, seems
to have had no doubts at all as to the propriety of his silence and this
apparent callousness is like an ugly ink splotch on a lovely filigree. We
cannot but hope, the elaboration in the second edition notwithstanding,
that there are still undisclosed facts which would temper our judgment
of him if we knew them all. In mentioning the matter in the book
Judge Powell talked out of turn, for there are times when, if all cannot
be told, nothing should be said. The author's failure to speak, when his
silence was calculated to shield a guilty man and execute an innocent
one, was not consistent with the character developed throughout the
pages of his autobiography.
In spite of a splotch, however, this book is a delightful visit with a
"superlative lawyer," to borrow a phrase from Chief Justice Bleckley.
Every attorney who reads it will agree that he never enjoyed himself
so much at any bar meeting.
Member of the North Carolina Bar,

SUSIE SHARP.

Reidsville, N. C.
Social Control Through Law. By Roscoe Pound.
University Press. 1942. Pp. 134. $2.00.

New Haven: Yale

This little book is the publication of the Mahlon Powell Lectures
delivered by Dean Pound at the University of Indiana. The first of
'A N. C. attorney swears allegiance to the state, to support the constitution
of the U. S. and to honestly demean himself in the practice of an attorney to the
best of his knowledge and belief. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§197, 3199,
3193, 3194.
"This was the argument made in 1743 in the somewhat similar case of
Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1229, cited in 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2298.
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the lectures is entitled "Civilization and Social Control"; the second,
"What Is Law"; the third, "The Task of Law"; and the fourth, "The
Problem of Values." The titles indicate the course of the argument;
and those who know Dean Pound do not need to be told that what
we have is a brilliant inquiry into the major problems of legal
philosophy.
The question, "What Is Law," is one that has been a source of controversy among lawyers for hundreds of years; and the controversy is
still going on with unabated interest. At one extreme, we have those
who see nothing in law but the ideal element; at the other, those who
see nothing but the exercise of force. The truth, as is generally the
case, is to be found between the extremes in a synthesis of the conflicting views. In these lectures, Dean Pound, with his varied learning, his wide experience and his vast common sense, makes the synthesis
for us, and in so doing points out the important part which legal ideas
have played in the development of civilization and the present importance of a correct concept of the nature and functions of law on the
part of those who teach and apply it.
Much of the confusion about the nature of law has arisen from the
fact that in talking about law men have bad in mind three very different
things: (1) what jurists now call the legal order-the regime of'adjusting relations and ordering conduct by the systematic and orderly application of the force of organized society; (2) the body of authoritative
materials, such as statutes, decisions, etc., which are used in applying
the force of society in the legal.order; and (3) the process in which
the authoritative materials are used. Dean Pound suggests that these
three meanings can be unified by the idea of social control. "We
might think," says he, "of a regime which is a highly specialized form
of social control, carried on in accordance with a body of authoritative
precepts, applied in a judicial and an administrative process."
In his first lecture, Dean Pound shows the part played by the
agencies of social control-religion, morals and law-in the development of civilization, and how, in the modem world, law has become
the paramount agency. He makes clear, however, that law must be
conceived of as representing far more than the mere force embodied in
the administration of the state. It must be thought of also as the
reason which guides and directs that force, and of the principles, rules
and standards for the carrying on of the task which are evolved by
reason in the process. "Civilization rests upon the putting down of
arbitrary, wilful self-assertion and the substitution of reason." There
is real danger inherent in the heresy which sees in law only the force
of 9rganized society or a threat to exercise that force. "Theories of
what is have marked effect on ideas of what ought to be.... If law-
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maker and judge and administrative official are taught that a law is a
threat of exercise of the force of politically organized society they tend
to leave out of account what is to be the content of the threat and consider only how far, in common speech, the threat can get by. Such
ideas have come into vogue with the rise of absolute government
throughout the world and give the autocrat the aid and comfort of
scientific theory."
The task of law is to reconcile conflicting interests or claims or
rights of individuals or groups so that the social organism can function
with the greatest good to the greatest number. "A legal system," says
Dean Pound, "attains the end of the legal order, or at any rate strives
to do so, by recognizing certain of these interests, by defining the limits within which these interests shall be recognized and given effect
through legal precepts developed and applied by the judicial (and today the administrative) process according to an authoritative technique,
and by endeavoring to secure the interests so recognized within defined limits." The denial by the skeptical realists of the reality of
rights or claims or interests is dealt with and effectively answered; and
the danger involved in such denial is thus cogently portrayed:
"This idea that there are no rights, that there are only threats announced by the ruling organ of a politically organized society, from
which, if executed, individuals may obtain certain advantages, is a
symptom of the rise of political absolutism all over the world. Under
an absolute polity and under the reign of such juristic theories there
is no need for the autocrat or the bureaucrat to be troubled about the
rights, that is, the interests or claims or demands (whether rightful or
moral or just or reconcilable with those urged by others) of anyone.
Constitutional guarantees are guarantees of phantoms. They may be
ignored. It is enough that the ruler has issued threats and has a
strong political organization under his control to make them good. It
is enough that an administrative official has been given power to execute
certain threats. No one has any standing to set up rights against his
manner of exercising that power. Such ideas on the part of administrative agencies, not at all uncommon in the government of the time,
are the fruit of theories that we can't prove anything in the nature of
a claim to be secured, that we can't establish with assurance of any
measure of values, that there is no way of reaching conviction that, on
the one hand, claims which we recognize should be limited in view of
other claims or, on the other hand, that one claim should be preferred
to the other on the basis of ascribing to its values and weighing those
values, and that there is nothing in law but an aggregate of threats.
We cannot 'do better than we try to do. If we give up what we have
sought to do in the past and say 'let those who control the force of
politically organized society make such threats as seem good to them,
either upon such reasons as appeal to them or without reasons,' we
give up what has made law a prime agency of civilization since the
days of the classical Roman jurists.
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"It is a boast rather than a description to call such teachings
'realism.' They ignore one of the most significant features of social
control by politically organized society, namely, the attempt to carry it
on upon a basis of reason and toward what is conceived of as justice....
"What is significant is the claim behind the legal right. Without
a recognized claim, recognized on a basis of reason, there is only an
arbitrary exercise of force for its own sake, something against which
we rebelled at the Revolution and to prevent which we set up frames
of government founded on a separation of powers with a bill of rights
in the forefront of them on the very morrow of the Declaration of
In'dependence."
The reconciling of conflicting rights or interests involves necessarily
their valuation in the social scheme; and the problems involved in this
valuation are the subject of the fourth lecture. Dean Pound points
out that the problem of reconciling conflicts and valuing the conflicting
rights or interests has involved: (1) ascertaining through experience
how conflicts may be resolved with the least impairment of the scheme
of interests as a whole and giving that experience a reasoned development; (2) "valuing with reference to the jural postulates of civilization in the time and pleace" and (3) valuing with reference to a "traditionally authoritative idea of the social order and hence of the legal
order, and of what legal institutions and 'doctrines should be and what
the result of applying them to controversies should be." Of the present traditionally authoritative idea of the social order, he says:
"It is one which has governed from the seventeenth to the nineteenth
century, getting what is likely to prove its final form in the latter. It
is a picture in which relation is ignored and each man is made to stand
out by himself as an economically, politically, morally and hence legally
self-sufficient unit. He is to find his place for himself by free competition. The highest good is the maximum of free self-assertion on the
part of these units. The significant feature of these units is their natural rights, that is, qualities by virtue of Nxhich they ought to have
certain things or be free to do certain things. The end of law is to
secure these natural rights, to give the fullest and freest rein to the
competitive acquisitory activities of these units, to order the competition with a minimum of interference. Only a decade ago one had outwardly to do lip service to this picture on pain of being branded
socialist or communist. It could hold no longer with us than elsewhere
because it did portray reasonably well a pioneer, rural, agricultural
society in a land with a great unsettled public domain and natural resources awaiting exploitation. But it has ceased to be a true picture of
the society in which the legal order must be carried on today."
After pointing out the important changes in our thinking in the
last fifty years, all pointing in a new direction, Dean Pound very correctly, I think, emphasizes the increasingly important part which co-
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operation must play in the social order and in the valuing of conflicting
interests. He says:
"If cooperation is not to be the whole idea, it is to be a large part of
it. But I prefer to think that the recognition of cooperation and new
emphasis upon it in all connections is a step toward some ideal involving
organized human effort along with free spontaneous individual initiative, and I seem to see such an ideal in the idea of civilization....
"An ideal of civilization, of raising human powers to their highest
possible unfolding, of the maximum of human control over external
nature and over internal nature for human purposes, must recognize
two factors in achieving that control: on the one hand, free individual
initiative, spontaneous self-assertion of individual men; and on the
other hand, cooperative, ordered, if you will, regimented activity.
Neither can be ignored if we are to maintain, go forward with, and
hand down control over nature. .

.

.

We are not compelled, because

we recognize cooperation as a factor in civilization, to sacrifice all that
was achieved in the last century by working out a system of individual
rights, or what has been achieved through and since the Puritan revolution toward securing individual freedom as a no less essential factor."
So-called legal realism has rendered a service in emphasizing that
law is not something imposed upon the social organism from without
but something that arises from within and that, in consideration of law,
the element which gives it authority or binding force may not be ignored. Some of its adherents have rendered a disservice which has
become a source of real danger in ignoring the ideal element and teaching that law is nothing but the application of force. Broadly considered, law is the life principle of the social organism-the categorical
imperative of organized society. This life principle must be interpreted
in terms of rules and standards, and these must be enforced by the
power of the state; but the source of the law is not the power which
enforces the rules and standards, but the life of the state itself, and
the source of the rules and standards is not that power, but reason
applied to the life of the state. It is not possible, of course, to deduce
a system of law from abstract reasoning about human rights. On the
other hand one is not realistic who does not see the organic nature of
society and the necessary relationships existing among its members.
And to ignore the fact that these necessary relationships form the basis
of the laws by which society lives and that the rules of law are deduced
by applying reason to these relationships, is to close one's eyes to the
most obvious fact with which the lawyer must deal.
In the changing concept of society to which Dean Pound refers,
legal philosophy has a most important task. It abdicates its function
when it abandons the search for the ideal and is willing to accept blind
force as the ultimate reality. The greatest danger that confronts civil-
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ization today is not the physical power of the totalitarian states, but
the false philosophy of law and government upon which these states are
founded. It will avail little to defeat their armies upon the fields of
battle if their philosophy is allowed to triumph so that government
based upon reason must give way to government based upon arbitrary
will. In pointing out the dangers inherent in the skeptical realism
which is in essence the philosophy of the totalitarian governments,
Dean Pound is rendering a service of the highest value. We are fortunate that the task has been undertaken by one of his learning and
intellectual power, who holds in such an eminent degree the respect of
lawyers and scholars everywhere.
JOHN J. PARKER.

U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
Charlotte, N. C.

